Redistribution, Taxes and the Median Voter
We study a simple model of production, accumulation, and redistribution, where agents are heterogeneous in their initial wealth, and a sequence of redistributive tax rates is voted upon. Though the policy is infinite-dimensional, we prove that a median voter theorem holds if households have identical, Gorman aggregable preferences; furthermore, the tax policy preferred by the median voter has the "bang-bang" property. (Copyright: Elsevier)
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Volume (Year): 9 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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