Representative Voter Theorems
The representative voter is an individual whose strict preference for any alternative x over any alternative y implies (1) x strictly defeats y by majority rule, if there are an odd number of voters, and (2) x weakly defeats y otherwise. This result holds for the median voter if x is his ideal point or if preferences satisfy a generalized symmetry property, but not in general. The authors examine a formal condition that guarantees the existence of a representative voter and an economic model in which this condition holds. They also indicate a method for estimating representative voting behavior that is justified when a representative voter exists, and compare this with a method for deriving median voting behavior from an estimated demand curve. Copyright 1991 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:72:y:1991:i:2-3:p:193-212. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.