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A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings

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  • B. D. Bernheim
  • S. N. Slavov

Abstract

We define and explore the notion of a Dynamic Condorcet Winner (DCW), which extends the notion of a Condorcet winner to dynamic settings. We show that, for every DCW, every member of a large class of dynamic majoritarian games has an equivalent equilibrium, and that other equilibria are not similarly portable across this class of games. Existence of DCWs is guaranteed when members of the community are sufficiently patient. We characterize sustainable and unsustainable outcomes, study the effects of changes in the discount factor, investigate efficiency properties, and explore the potential for achieving renegotiation-proof outcomes. We apply this solution concept to a standard one-dimensional choice problem wherein agents have single-peaked preferences, as well as to one involving the division of a fixed aggregate pay-off. Copyright , Wiley-Blackwell.

Suggested Citation

  • B. D. Bernheim & S. N. Slavov, 2009. "A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(1), pages 33-62.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:76:y:2009:i:1:p:33-62
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00520.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Roessler & Sandro Shelegia, 2012. "The Roman Metro Problem," Vienna Economics Papers 1202, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    2. Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2017. "Multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 112-121.
    3. Philippe De Donder & Michel Le Breton & Eugenio Peluso, 2012. "Majority Voting in Multidimensional Policy Spaces: Kramer–Shepsle versus Stackelberg," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 14(6), pages 879-909, December.
    4. Facundo Piguillem & Anderson Schneider, 2013. "Heterogeneous Labor Skills, The Median Voter and Labor Taxes," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 16(2), pages 332-349, April.
    5. Kirill Borissov & Mikhail Pakhnin, 2018. "Economic growth and property rights on natural resources," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(2), pages 423-482, March.
    6. Borissov, Kirill & Surkov, Alexander, 2010. "Endogenous growth in a model with heterogeneous agents and voting on public goods," MPRA Paper 27517, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Christian Roessler & Sandro Shelegia & Bruno Strulovici, 2013. "The Roman Metro Problem: Dynamic Voting and the Limited Power of Commitment," Discussion Papers 1560, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    8. Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Dynamic Reform of Political Institutions," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 47, Econometric Society.
    9. BORISSOV, Kirill & BRECHET, Thierry & LAMBRECHT, Stéphane, 2012. "Environmental maintenance in a dynamic model with heterogenous agents," CORE Discussion Papers 2012008, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    10. Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000876, UCLA Department of Economics.
    11. Borissov, Kirill & Pakhnin, Mikhail & Puppe, Clemens, 2017. "On discounting and voting in a simple growth model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 185-204.
    12. Kevin Roberts, 2007. "Condorcet cycles? A model of intertemporal voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(3), pages 383-404, October.
    13. Hassler, John & Krusell, Per & Storesletten, Kjetil & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2005. "The dynamics of government," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1331-1358, October.
    14. Kirill Borissov & Alexander Surkov, 2010. "Common and Private Property to Exhaustible Resources: Theoretical Implications for Economic Growth," EUSP Department of Economics Working Paper Series Ec-02/10, European University at St. Petersburg, Department of Economics, revised 29 Sep 2010.
    15. Kirill Borissov & Alexander Surkov, 2012. "Public versus Private Ownership of Exhaustible Resources in Models of Economic Growth with Heterogeneous Consumers," DEGIT Conference Papers c017_046, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
    16. Lagunoff, Roger, 2009. "Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 569-583, November.
    17. Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), 2005. "Markov Equilibrium in Models of Dynamic Endogenous Political Institutions," Working Papers gueconwpa~05-05-07, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
    18. Marina Azzimonti & Eva de Francisco & Per Krusell, 2005. "Median-voter Equilibria in the Neoclassical Growth Model under Aggregation: Working Paper 2005-09," Working Papers 17577, Congressional Budget Office.
    19. Hannu Vartiainen, 2015. "Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(2), pages 309-327, September.
    20. Jinhui Bai & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "On the “Faustian” Dynamics of Policy and Political Power," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001627, UCLA Department of Economics.
    21. Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Dynamic Stability and Reform of Political Institutions," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000051, UCLA Department of Economics.
    22. Akira Okada & Ryoji Sawa, 2016. "An evolutionary approach to social choice problems with q-quota rules," KIER Working Papers 936, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.

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    • C00 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - General

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