IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v35y2006i1p39-69.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Repeated Downsian electoral competition

Author

Listed:
  • John Duggan

    ()

  • Mark Fey

    ()

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • John Duggan & Mark Fey, 2006. "Repeated Downsian electoral competition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(1), pages 39-69, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:35:y:2006:i:1:p:39-69 DOI: 10.1007/s00182-006-0046-1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-006-0046-1
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John Duggan, 2000. "Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 109-135, July.
    2. Kramer, Gerald H., 1977. "A dynamical model of political equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 310-334, December.
    3. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-554, May.
    4. Norman Schofield, 1983. "Generic Instability of Majority Rule," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 695-705.
    5. Bernhardt, Dan & Dubey, Sangita & Hughson, Eric, 2004. "Term limits and pork barrel politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 2383-2422.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Seok-ju Cho & John Duggan, 2015. "A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 933-948, November.
    2. Kalandrakis, Tasos, 2009. "A Reputational Theory of Two-Party Competition," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, pages 343-378.
    3. Hans Grüner, 2009. "Inequality and Political Consensus," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 239-265.
    4. César Martinelli & John Duggan, 2014. "The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results," Working Papers 1403, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    5. Vincent Anesi, 2012. "A new old solution for weak tournaments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(4), pages 919-930, October.
    6. Enriqueta Aragonès & Thomas R. Palfrey & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Reputation and Rhetoric in Elections," Working Papers 236, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    7. Hatfield, John, 2006. "Federalism, Taxation, and Economic Growth," Research Papers 1929, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    8. Forand, Jean Guillaume, 2014. "Two-party competition with persistent policies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 64-91.
    9. Jon X. Eguia & Kenneth A. Shepsle, 2014. "Endogenous Assembly Rules, Senior Agenda Power, and Incumbency Advantage," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 14/638, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    10. B. D. Bernheim & S. N. Slavov, 2009. "A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(1), pages 33-62.
    11. Hatfield, John William, 2015. "Federalism, taxation, and economic growth," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 114-125.
    12. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 2008. "A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, pages 269-299.
    13. Sleet, Christopher & Yeltekin, Sevin, 2008. "Politically credible social insurance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, pages 129-151.
    14. John Duggan, 2013. "A Folk Theorem for Repeated Elections with Adverse Selection," Wallis Working Papers WP64, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:35:y:2006:i:1:p:39-69. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.