Tying the Politicians’ Hands: The Optimal Limits to Representative Democracy
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- Didier Laussel & Ngo Long, 2019. "Tying the politicians’ hands: The optimal limits to representative democracy," Post-Print hal-02274376, HAL.
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More about this item
KeywordsRepresentative Democracy; Optimal Delegation; Political Uncertainty; Policy Caps; Policy Floors; Citizen Candidates; Démocratie représentative; Délégation optimale; Incertitude politique; Plafonds de politique; Planchers de politique; Candidats citoyens;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
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