The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation
Why do both left and right political parties typically propose progressive income taxation schemes in political competition? Analysis of this problem has been hindered by the two-dimensionality space of admissible tax policies: Nash equilibria in pure strategies of the usual political game generically fail to exist. A new equilibrium concept, based on the fact of factional conflict within parties, is introduced. Each party has incomplete preference orders on the strategy space, formed as the intersection of the complete preference orders of its factions. Nash equilibria of the two-party game, so construed, do exist and, in such equilibria, both parties propose progressive income taxation.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 67 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: 1 212 998 3820|
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Web: https://www.econometricsociety.org/publications/econometrica/access/ordering-back-issues Email: |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:67:y:1999:i:1:p:1-20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.