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Majority Voting Over Lotteries: Conditions for Existence of a Decisive Voter

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  • John Duggan

    (U of Rochester)

Abstract

This note extends known sufficient conditions for existence of a decisive voter in pairwise voting over lotteries. The preferred lottery of such a voter always coincides with the lottery preferred by a majority, meaning voting can be reduced to a decision problem of the decisive voter. The results are useful in solving dynamic models of bargaining and elections, where a binary vote can be expressed as a choice between two lotteries (depending on the discount factor), and voting subgames can be reduced to a decision problem of the decisive voter.

Suggested Citation

  • John Duggan, 2014. "Majority Voting Over Lotteries: Conditions for Existence of a Decisive Voter," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(1), pages 263-270.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-14-00037
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jeffrey Banks & John Duggan, 2006. "A Social Choice Lemma on Voting Over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(2), pages 285-304, April.
    2. Cho, Seok-ju & Duggan, John, 2003. "Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 118-130, November.
    3. Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February.
    4. Davis, Otto A & DeGroot, Morris H & Hinich, Melvin J, 1972. "Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(1), pages 147-157, January.
    5. Rothstein, Paul, 1991. "Representative Voter Theorems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 72(2-3), pages 193-212, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Roberti, Paolo, 2019. "Citizens or lobbies: Who controls policy?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 497-514.
    2. Bils, Peter & Duggan, John & Judd, Gleason, 2021. "Lobbying and policy extremism in repeated elections," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    3. Navin Kartik & SangMok Lee & Daniel Rappoport, 2024. "Single-Crossing Differences in Convex Environments," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 91(5), pages 2981-3012.
    4. Vohra, Akhil, 2023. "Losing money to make money: The benefits of redistribution in collective bargaining in sports," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 226-242.
    5. John Duggan & Jean Guillaume Forand, 2021. "Representative Voting Games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(3), pages 443-466, April.
    6. César Martinelli & John Duggan, 2014. "The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results," Working Papers 1403, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    7. Zapal, Jan, 2020. "Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    8. Awad, Emiel & Minaudier, Clement, 2023. "Persuasive Lobbying and the Value of Connections," SocArXiv 8z4ax, Center for Open Science.

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    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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