Majority Voting Over Lotteries: Conditions for Existence of a Decisive Voter
This note extends known sufficient conditions for existence of a decisive voter in pairwise voting over lotteries. The preferred lottery of such a voter always coincides with the lottery preferred by a majority, meaning voting can be reduced to a decision problem of the decisive voter. The results are useful in solving dynamic models of bargaining and elections, where a binary vote can be expressed as a choice between two lotteries (depending on the discount factor), and voting subgames can be reduced to a decision problem of the decisive voter.
Volume (Year): 34 (2014)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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- Seok-ju Cho & John Duggan, 2001.
"Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibria in a one-Dimensional Model of Bargaining,"
Wallis Working Papers
WP23, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- Cho, Seok-ju & Duggan, John, 2003. "Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 118-130, November.
- Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February.
- Rothstein, Paul, 1991. " Representative Voter Theorems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 72(2-3), pages 193-212, December.
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