Majority Voting in Multidimensional Policy Spaces: Kramer-Shepsle versus Stackelberg
We study majority voting over a bidimensional policy space when the voters' type space is either uni- or bidimensional. We show that a Condorcet winner fails to generically exist even with a unidimensional type space. We then study two voting procedures widely used in the literature. The Stackelberg (ST) procedure assumes that votes are taken one dimension at a time according to an exogenously specified sequence. The Kramer-Shepsle (KS) procedure also assumes that votes are taken separately on each dimension, but not in a sequential way. A vector of policies is a Kramer-Shepsle equilibrium if each component coincides with the majority choice on this dimension given the other components of the vector. We study the existence and uniqueness of the ST and KS equilibria, and we compare them, looking e.g. at the impact of the ordering of votes for ST and identifying circumstances under which ST and KS equilibria coincide. In the process, we state explicitly the assumptions on the utility function that are needed for these equilibria to be well behaved. We especially stress the importance of single crossing conditions, and we identify two variants of these assumptions: a marginal version that is imposed on all policy dimensions separately, and a joint version whose definition involves both policy dimensions.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol.�14, n°6, décembre 2012, p.�879-909.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +33 (0)5 61 12 85 89
Fax: + 33 (0)5 61 12 86 37
Web page: http://www.idei.fr/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alberto Alesina & Reza Baqir & William Easterly, 1999.
"Public Goods And Ethnic Divisions,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1243-1284, November.
- Baqir, Reza & Easterly, William & Alesina, Alberto, 1999. "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions," Scholarly Articles 4551797, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alberto Alesina & Reza Baqir & William Easterly, 1997. "Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions," NBER Working Papers 6009, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alesina, Alberto & Baqir, Reza & Easterly, William, 1999. "Public goods and ethnic divisions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2108, The World Bank.
- Philippe De Donder & Jean Hindriks, 1998.
"The political economy of targeting,"
Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 177-200, April.
- B. Douglas Bernheim & Sita Nataraj Slavov, 2007.
"A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings,"
07-029, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- B. D. Bernheim & S. N. Slavov, 2009. "A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(1), pages 33-62.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1996.
"Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory,"
1162, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Alberto Alesina & Reza Baqir & Caroline Hoxby, 2000.
"Political Jurisdictions in Heterogeneous Communities,"
NBER Working Papers
7859, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alberto Alesina & Reza Baqir & Caroline Hoxby, 2004. "Political Jurisdictions in Heterogeneous Communities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(2), pages 348-396, April.
- Hoxby, Caroline & Baqir, Reza & Alesina, Alberto, 2004. "Political Jurisdictions in Heterogeneous Communities," Scholarly Articles 4552532, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alberto Alesina & Reza Baqir & Caroline Hoxby, 2002. "Political Jurisdictions in Heterogeneous Communities," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1949, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February.
- repec:hrv:faseco:4553034 is not listed on IDEAS
- Nechyba, Thomas J, 1997.
"Local Property and State Income Taxes: The Role of Interjurisdictional Competition and Collusion,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 351-84, April.
- Thomas J. Nechyba, 1996. "Local Property and State Income Taxes: The Role of Interjurisdictional Competition and Collusion," NBER Working Papers 5419, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sadanand, Asha B & Williamson, John M, 1991. "Equilibrium in a Stock Market Economy with Shareholder Voting," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(1), pages 1-35, February.
- Banks, Jeffrey & Duggan, John & Le Breton, Michel, 2003.
"Social Choice and Electoral Competition in the General Spatial Model,"
IDEI Working Papers
188, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John & Le Breton, Michel, 2006. "Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 194-234, January.
- John Duggan, . "Non-Cooperative Games Among Groups," Wallis Working Papers WP21, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- Filippo Gregorini, 2007. "Political Geography and Income Inequalities," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Teoria Economica e Metodi Quantitativi itemq0746, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
- Filippo Gregorini, 2009. "Political Geography and Income Inequalities," Working Papers 152, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2009.
- Helmuth Cremer & Philippe De Donder & Firouz Gahvari, 2004. "Taxes, Budgetary Rule and Majority Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(3_4), pages 335-358, 06.
- Carlo Perroni & Kimberley A. Scharf, .
"Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and Constitutional Choices,"
EPRU Working Paper Series
97-05, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Perroni, Carlo & Scharf, Kimberly A, 2001. "Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and Constitutional Choices," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(1), pages 133-54, January.
- Diba, Behzad & Feldman, Allan M., 1984. "Utility functions for public outputs and majority voting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 235-243, November.
- Haimanko, Ori & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2005. "Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(7), pages 1277-1303, July.
- Davis, Otto A & DeGroot, Morris H & Hinich, Melvin J, 1972. "Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(1), pages 147-57, January.
- Federico Etro, 2006. "Political geography," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 321-343, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:21845. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.