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Financial systemic risk: Taxation or regulation?

  • Masciandaro, Donato
  • Passarelli, Francesco

This paper describes financial systemic risk as a pollution issue. Free riding leads to excess risk production. This problem may be solved, at least partially, either by financial regulation or by taxation. From a normative viewpoint, taxation is superior in many respects. However, reality shows that financial regulation is adopted more frequently. This paper makes a positive, politico-economic argument. If the majority chooses regulation, the level is likely to be too harsh. If it chooses taxation, then the level is likely to be too low. Due to regressive effects, a tax on financial transactions receives low support from a majority of low polluting portfolio owners. The same kind of majority may strategically choose regulation in order to burden the minority with a larger share of the cost of reducing systemic risk.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Banking & Finance.

Volume (Year): 37 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 587-596

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:37:y:2013:i:2:p:587-596
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf

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