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Crime and the labor market: a search model with optimal contracts

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  • Bryan Engelhardt
  • Guillaume Rocheteau
  • Peter Rupert

Abstract

This paper extends the Pissarides (2000) model of the labor market to include crime and punishment `a la Becker (1968). All workers, irrespective of their labor force status can commit crimes and the employment contract is determined optimally. The model is used to study, analytically and quantitatively, the effects of various labor market and crime policies. For instance, a more generous unemployment insurance system reduces the crime rate of the unemployed but its effect on the crime rate of the employed depends on job duration and jail sentences. When the model is calibrated to U.S. data, the overall effect on crime is positive but quantitatively small. Wage subsidies reduce unemployment and crime rates of employed and unemployed workers, and improve society’s welfare. Hiring subsidies reduce unemployment but they can raise the crime rate of employed workers. Crime policies (police technology and jail sentences) affect crime rates significantly but have only negligible effects on the labor market.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in its series Working Paper with number 0715.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:0715
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Keywords: Crime ; Unemployment ; Labor market;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
  • J0 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General
  • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
  • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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Cited by:

  1. Bryan Engelhardt, 2008. "The Effect of Employment Frictions on Crime: Theory and Estimation," Working Papers 0805, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
  2. Manolis Galenianos & Rosalie Liccardo Pacula & Nicola Persico, 2012. "A Search-Theoretic Model of the Retail Market for Illicit Drugs," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(3), pages 1239-1269.
  3. Thomas Bassetti, Luca Corazzini, Darwin Cortes, 2010. "Crime, Immigration and the Labor Market: A General Equilibrium Model," ISLA Working Papers 38, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  4. Kyriakos C. Neanidis & Vea Papadopoulou, 2012. "Crime, Fertility, and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 163, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.
  5. Thomas Bassetti & Luca Corazzini & Darwin Cortes & Luca Nunziata, 2013. "Do Immigrants Make Us Safer? A Model on Crime, Immigration and the Labor Market," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0121, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
  6. David L. Fuller & Bryan Engelhardt, 2010. "Labor Force Participation and Pair-wise Efficient Contracts with Search and Bargaining," Working Papers 12005, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised 20 Jan 2012.
  7. Engelhardt, Bryan & Rocheteau, Guillaume & Rupert, Peter, 2008. "Crime and the labor market: A search model with optimal contracts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 1876-1891, October.
  8. Bethencourt, Carlos & Kunze, Lars, 2014. "On the intergenerational nature of criminal behavior," MPRA Paper 58344, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Bryan Engelhardt & David L. Fuller, 2009. "Efficient Labor Force Participation with Search and Bargaining," Working Papers 0909, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2009.
  10. Gabriele Camera & Bryan Engelhardt, 2014. "Nonmedical Prescription Drug Use: Theory and Policy Implications," Working Papers 1402, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
  11. Masciandaro, Donato & Passarelli, Francesco, 2013. "Financial systemic risk: Taxation or regulation?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 587-596.
  12. Syed Yasir Mahmood Gillani & Rana Ejaz Ali Khan & Abid Rashid Gill, 2011. "Unemployment and Property Crimes in Pakistan," Asian Economic and Financial Review, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 1(3), pages 124-133, September.
  13. Catalina Gómez Toro & Hermilson Velásquez & Joaquín Andrés Urrego & Juan David Valderrama, 2014. "Efecto de los Ingresos Permanentes sobre el Delito: Un Enfoque Espacial y un Caso de Aplicación," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO CIEF 010900, UNIVERSIDAD EAFIT.

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