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Populism, Political Pressure and Central Bank (in)Dependence

Author

Listed:
  • Donato Masciandaro

    (Bocconi University
    SUERF)

  • Francesco Passarelli

    (University of Turin
    Bocconi University)

Abstract

This article analyses the relationships between inequality, political pressure, populism and central bank independence (CBI). If there is financial inequality across citizens, monetary policies yield distributional consequences. Political pressure on central bank will increase. A populist wave fuelled by large demand for redistribution with no regard to long term consequences may undermine actual CBI.

Suggested Citation

  • Donato Masciandaro & Francesco Passarelli, 2020. "Populism, Political Pressure and Central Bank (in)Dependence," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 691-705, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:31:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s11079-019-09550-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s11079-019-09550-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dautović, Ernest & Hsieh, Robin, 2024. "Government-guaranteed credit and populism," Working Paper Series 2993, European Central Bank.
    2. Oriola, Hugo, 2023. "Political monetary cycles: An empirical study," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    3. Hyunwoo Kim, 2023. "The microfoundation of macroeconomic populism: The effects of economic inequality on public inflation aversion," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 65-96, March.
    4. Hugo Oriola & Matthieu Picault, 2023. "Opportunistic Political Central Bank Coverage: Does media coverage of ECB's Monetary Policy Impacts German Political Parties' Popularity?," EconomiX Working Papers 2023-30, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    5. Rieder, Kilian, 2022. "Monetary policy decision-making by committee: Why, when and how it can work," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Populism; Monetary policy; Central bank Independence; Inequality; Political economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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