Revisiting the Case for a Populist Central Banker
It is known that discretionary policy may give rise to an inflationary bias if wages are negotiated in nominal terms. It has recently been argued that this bias can be eliminated, and welfare maximized, by the appointment of a central banker who does not care at all about inflation (a "populist" central banker). A conceptual flaw of the latter result is identified here. It is shown that when wages are negotiated in nominal terms the result is true only in the special case of a single, allencompassing, union. In the more general case of multiple unions, however, inflation increases linearly with their number and a populist central bank may turn out to decrease welfare.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.bancaditalia.it
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Guzzo, Vincenzo & Velasco, Andres, 1999. "The case for a populist Central Banker," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1317-1344, June.
- Lippi, Francesco, 1999. "Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage Setters: A Case for Non-Neutrality," CEPR Discussion Papers 2218, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_386_00. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.