IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory


  • Roger B. Myerson


This paper offers a short introduction to some of the fundamental results of social choice theory. Topics include Nash implementability, monotonic social choice correspondences, the Muller-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem, anonymous and neutral social choice correspondences, sophisticated solutions of binary agendas, the top cycle of a tournament, the bipartisan set for two-party competition, and median voter theorems. The paper begins with a simple example to illustrate the importance of multiple equilibria in game-theoretic models of political institutions.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Roger B. Myerson, 1996. "Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory," Discussion Papers 1162, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1162

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Roger B. Myerson & Robert J. Weber, 1988. "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," Discussion Papers 782, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Gibbard, Allan, 1978. "Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(3), pages 595-614, May.
    3. Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
    4. Sloth Birgitte, 1993. "The Theory of Voting and Equilibria in Noncooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 152-169, January.
    5. Laffond G. & Laslier J. F. & Le Breton M., 1993. "The Bipartisan Set of a Tournament Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 182-201, January.
    6. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Social choice," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 31, pages 1091-1125 Elsevier.
    7. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
    8. Roberts, Kevin W. S., 1977. "Voting over income tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 329-340, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Bouton, Laurent & Gratton, Gabriele, 2015. "Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
    2. Jamal Nazrul Islam & Haradhan Kumar Mohajan & Pahlaj Moolio, 2009. "Political Economy and Social Welfare with Voting Procedure," KASBIT Business Journals, Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari Institute of Technology (KASBIT), vol. 2, pages 42-66, December.
    3. Saporiti, Alejandro, 2009. "Strategy-proofness and single-crossing," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 4(2), June.
    4. Alejandro Saporiti & Fernando Tohmé, 2006. "Single-Crossing, Strategic Voting and the Median Choice Rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(2), pages 363-383, April.
    5. Mazurek, Jiří, 2015. "On a preference analysis in a group decision making," MPRA Paper 64998, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Dogru, Bulent, 2013. "Arrow’un İmkânsızlık Teoremi İle Kafkasya’daki Sorunların Analizi
      [Analysis of Problems In Caucasıa Using Arrow's Impossibility Theorem]
      ," MPRA Paper 66377, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Joungseok Park, 2016. "How Democracy Matters: Evidence of Electoral Incentives for Environmental Policy," Working Papers 16-20, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
    8. repec:ksb:journl:v:2:y:2009:i:1:p:42-66 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1162. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fran Walker). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.