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Representation and Institutional Stability

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  • Scott H. Ainsworth

Abstract

In a developing legislature, two types of stability are crucial for maintaining institutional viability. The first type of stability identifies legislative proposals that are invulnerable to majority rule voting cycles. The research addressing the implications of majority rule voting cycles has been rich and sustained, allowing scholars to address committee structures of institutionalized legislatures and norms. However, many formal theories of modern legislatures are not readily applicable to less structurally developed legislatures. In this paper, a simple majority rule game is used to illustrate two types of legislative stability: majority rule stability and stability against various obstructionary tactics including outright secession. For a developing legislature to become institutionalized, both types of stability are necessary.

Suggested Citation

  • Scott H. Ainsworth, 1997. "Representation and Institutional Stability," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 9(2), pages 147-165, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:9:y:1997:i:2:p:147-165
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692897009002001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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