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Unraveling in Democratically Governed Groups

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  • PAUL EDWARD JOHNSON

    (University of Kansas)

Abstract

This essay presents a framework for the analysis of voting processes in interest group organizations. It explores the tension between majority rule and membership maintenance in a group. The major theoretical propositions are that myopic majority rule government can cause instability and a loss of members from the group. The risk of this instability, which is called unraveling, leads to behavioral and institutional solutions that impose nonmedian social choices on the group members. The theory is applied to the founding era of the American Federation of Labor, an important, long-lived organization. It is shown that the most important features of the AFL in this century are best explained by reference to the theory of social choice in voluntary organizations.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Edward Johnson, 1990. "Unraveling in Democratically Governed Groups," Rationality and Society, , vol. 2(1), pages 4-34, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:2:y:1990:i:1:p:4-34
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463190002001002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Westhoff, Frank, 1979. "Policy inferences from community choice models: A caution," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 535-549, October.
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    3. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416-416.
    4. Aldrich, John H., 1983. "A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(4), pages 974-990, December.
    5. Rothenberg, Lawrence S., 1988. "Organizational Maintenance and the Retention Decision in Groups," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(4), pages 1129-1152, December.
    6. Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1979. "Market models of local government: Exit, voting, and the land market," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 319-337, July.
    7. Greenberg, Joseph & Weber, Shlomo, 1986. "Strong tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 101-117, February.
    8. McConnell, Grant, 1958. "The Spirit of Private Government," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(3), pages 754-770, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Barry Nalebuff & Richard Sansing, 1996. "The Rationally Shrinking Union," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 51-59, March.
    2. Scott H. Ainsworth, 1997. "Representation and Institutional Stability," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 9(2), pages 147-165, April.
    3. Paul E. Johnson, 1996. "Unraveling in a Variety of Institutional Settings," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 8(3), pages 299-330, July.

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