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Median voter model cannot solve all the problems of voting system

Author

Listed:
  • Islam, Jamal
  • Mohajan, Haradhan
  • Moolio, Pahlaj

Abstract

The median voter theorem is one of the most prominent results of formal political theory and economics, and is widely used to study interactions between them. The median voter is the person in the middle of the distribution on the single dimension and is a more accurate predictor of decision outcomes under simple majority voting system. Politicians believe that elections are logically imperfect. Median voting model has such imperfections less than the other models and an attempt has been taken to explore these in some details. Although the median voting model plays a pioneer role in modern democracy but it can not solve all the problems of voting system, and the paper deals where the median voter theorem fails.

Suggested Citation

  • Islam, Jamal & Mohajan, Haradhan & Moolio, Pahlaj, 2010. "Median voter model cannot solve all the problems of voting system," MPRA Paper 50696, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Feb 2011.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:50696
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50696/1/MPRA_paper_50696.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February.
    2. Alejandro Saporiti & Fernando Tohmé, 2006. "Single-Crossing, Strategic Voting and the Median Choice Rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(2), pages 363-383, April.
    3. Barberà, Salvador & Moreno, Bernardo, 2011. "Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 345-359.
    4. Klaus, Bettina & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 1997. "Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 339-346, September.
    5. repec:ksb:journl:v:2:y:2009:i:1:p:42-66 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Mathias Risse, 2005. "Why the count de Borda cannot beat the Marquis de Condorcet," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(1), pages 95-113, October.
    7. Jamal Nazrul Islam & Haradhan Kumar Mohajan & Pahlaj Moolio, 2009. "Political Economy and Social Welfare with Voting Procedure," KASBIT Business Journals, Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari Institute of Technology (KASBIT), vol. 2, pages 42-66, December.
    8. Klaus, Bettina, 2001. "Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 64-82, January.
    9. Islam, Jamal & Mohajan, Haradhan & Moolio, Pahlaj, 2010. "Methods of voting system and manipulation of voting," MPRA Paper 50854, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 May 2010.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Median voter; Single-peakedness; Single-crossing and Top monotonicity.;

    JEL classification:

    • C3 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables

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