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Single-basined choice

  • Bossert, Walter
  • Peters, Hans

Single-basined preferences generalize single-dipped preferences by allowing for multiple worst elements. Single-dipped and single-basined preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of single-basinedness in a choice-theoretic setting, with the set of all compact convex subsets of Rn as the domain of choice sets. In conjunction with independence of irrelevant alternatives, single-basined choice implies a structure that conforms to the motivation underlying our definition. We establish the consequences of requiring single-basined choice correspondences to be upper semicontinuous. Moreover, we extend our results to larger domains of non-convex sets.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 52 (2014)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 162-168

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:52:y:2014:i:c:p:162-168
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

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