Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Berga, Dolors & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2000.
"Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with One Public Good,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 39-61, January.
- Berga, D & Serizawa, S, 1996. "Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with one Public Good," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 353.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Lin Zhou, 1991. "Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 107-119.
- Yves Sprumont, 1995. "Strategyproof Collective Choice in Economic and Political Environments," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 68-107, February.
- H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
- Barbera Salvador & Gul Faruk & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 262-289, December.
- Barbera, S. & Gul, F. & Stacchetti, E., 1992. "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 184.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Kim C. Border & J. S. Jordan, 1983. "Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(1), pages 153-170. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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