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Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model

Author

Listed:
  • Lahiri, A.

    (Quantitative Economics)

  • Peters, H.J.M.

    (Quantitative Economics)

  • Storcken, A.J.A.

    (Quantitative Economics)

Abstract

We consider the joint decision of placing public bads in each of two neighboring countries, modelled by two adjacent line segments. Residents of the two countries have single-dipped preferences, determined by the location of the nearest public bad to their dips. A social choice function or rule takes a profile of reported preferences as input and assigns the location of the public bad in each country. All rules satisfying strategy-proofness, country-specific Pareto optimality, non-corruptibility, and the far away condition are characterized. These rules pick only boundary locations.

Suggested Citation

  • Lahiri, A. & Peters, H.J.M. & Storcken, A.J.A., 2015. "Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model," Research Memorandum 007, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    • Handle: RePEc:unm:umagsb:2015007
    DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2015007
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    Cited by:

    1. Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup, 2021. "A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    2. Dietzenbacher, Bas & Tamura, Yuki, 2024. "Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    3. Doudou Gong & Bas Dietzenbacher & Hans Peters, 2024. "Mechanisms and axiomatics for division problems with single-dipped preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(3), pages 789-813, November.
    4. Peters, Hans & Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup & Storcken, Ton, 2017. "An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 84-90.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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