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Single-Basined Choice

Author

Listed:
  • Walter Bossert
  • Hans Peters

Abstract

Single-basined preferences generalize single-dipped preferences by allowing for multiple worst elements. These preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of singlebasinedness in a choice-theoretic setting. In conjunction with independence of irrelevant alternatives, single-basined choice implies a structure that conforms to the motivation underlying our definition. We also establish the consequences of requiring single-basined choice correspondences to be upper semicontinuous, and of the revealed preference relation to be Suzumura consistent.

Suggested Citation

  • Walter Bossert & Hans Peters, 2013. "Single-Basined Choice," Cahiers de recherche 04-2013, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:04-2013
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans, 2014. "Single-basined choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 162-168.
    2. Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2015. "Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 32-39.
    3. Diss, Mostapha & Doghmi, Ahmed & Tlidi, Abdelmonaim, 2015. "Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences," MPRA Paper 75469, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Dec 2016.
    4. Gong, Doudou & Dietzenbacher, Bas & Peters, Hans, 2022. "Mechanisms for division problems with single-dipped preferences," Research Memorandum 007, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Single-basinedness; choice correspondences; independence of irrelevant alternatives; upper semicontinuity; Suzumura consistency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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