Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc
In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a disc in the Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the disc. It is proved that any strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule is dictatorial. This framework models situations where public bads such as garbage dumping grounds or nuclear plants have to be located within a confined region that has the shape of a disc.
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