Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences
We consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible endowment among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. A probabilistic allocation rule assigns a probability distribution over the set of possible allocations to every preference profile. We discuss characterizations of the classes of Pareto-optimal and strategy-proof probabilistic rules which satisfy in addition replacement-domination or no-envy. Interestingly, these results also apply to problems of allocating finitely many identical indivisible objects - to probabilistic and to deterministic allocation.
Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Note:||Received: 23 November 1998/Accepted: 20 October 2000|
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|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/355|