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Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences

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  • Lars Ehlers

    (Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands and Département de Sciences Économiques and C.R.D.E., Université de Montréal, Québec H3C 3J7, Canada)

Abstract

We consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible endowment among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. A probabilistic allocation rule assigns a probability distribution over the set of possible allocations to every preference profile. We discuss characterizations of the classes of Pareto-optimal and strategy-proof probabilistic rules which satisfy in addition replacement-domination or no-envy. Interestingly, these results also apply to problems of allocating finitely many identical indivisible objects - to probabilistic and to deterministic allocation.

Suggested Citation

  • Lars Ehlers, 2002. "Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(2), pages 325-348.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:19:y:2002:i:2:p:325-348
    Note: Received: 23 November 1998/Accepted: 20 October 2000
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans, 2014. "Single-basined choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 162-168.
    2. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(3), pages 249-268, October.
    3. Dietzenbacher, Bas & Tamura, Yuki, 2023. "Fair and efficient allocations when preferences are single-dipped," Research Memorandum 009, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    4. Ahmed Doghmi, 2013. "Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(1), pages 1-12, January.
    5. Fumiya Inoue & Hirofumi Yamamura, 2023. "Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(4), pages 647-669, May.
    6. Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506, Elsevier.
    7. Yamamura, Hirofumi, 2023. "Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 230(C).
    8. Toyotaka Sakai, 2012. "Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 50(2), pages 499-521, June.
    9. Dietzenbacher, Bas & Tamura, Yuki, 2023. "Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
    10. Laurence Kranich, 2019. "Divide-and-choose with nonmonotonic preferences," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 271-276, December.
    11. Murat Öztürk & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 2014. "On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 83-108, May.
    12. Basteck, Christian & Ehlers, Lars H., 2023. "On the constrained efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2023-202, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.

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