Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules
We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We also show that in this characterization no-envy cannot be replaced by anonymity. When agents are strictly risk averse von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizers, then we reduce the problem of assigning k identical objects to a problem of allocating the amount k of an infinitely divisible commodity.
|Date of creation:||2001|
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- Hervé Moulin, 2002.
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Social Choice and Welfare,
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- Lars Ehlers, 2002. "Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(2), pages 325-348. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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