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Fair Queuing and Other Probabilistic Allocation Methods

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  • Moulin, Herve

    (Rice U)

  • Stong, Richard

Abstract

A server processes one job per unit of time and randomly schedules the jobs requested by a given set of users; each user may request a different number of jobs. Fair queuing (Shenker 1989) schedules jobs in successive round-robin fashion, where each agent receives one unit in each round until his demand is met and the ordering is random in each round. Fair queuing *, the reverse scheduling of fair queuing, serves first (with uniform probability) one of the users with the largest remaining demand. We characterize fair queuing * by the combination of lower composition--LC--(the scheduling sequence is history independent), demand monotonicity--DM--(increasing my demand cannot result in increased delay) and two equity axioms, equal treatment ex ante--ETEA (two identical demands give the same probability distribution of service) and equal treatment ex post--ETEP (two identical demands must be served in alternating fashion). The set of dual axioms (in which ETEA and ETEP are unchanged) characterizes fair queuing. We also characterize the rich family of methods satisfying LC, DM, and the familiar consistency--CSY--axiom. They work by fixing a standard of comparison (preordering) between a demand of xi units by agent i and one of xj units by agent j. The first job scheduled is drawn from the agents whose demand has the highest standard.

Suggested Citation

  • Moulin, Herve & Stong, Richard, 2001. "Fair Queuing and Other Probabilistic Allocation Methods," Working Papers 2000-09, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:riceco:2000-09
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    File URL: http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~econ/papers/2000papers/09Moulin.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hervé Moulin, 2002. "The proportional random allocation of indivisible units," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(2), pages 381-413.
    2. Moulin, Herve, 2002. "Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 289-357, Elsevier.
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    7. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Social choice," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 31, pages 1091-1125, Elsevier.
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    Cited by:

    1. Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2013. "Markovian assignment rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 1-25, January.
    2. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(3), pages 249-268, October.
    3. Hervé Moulin, 2002. "The proportional random allocation of indivisible units," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(2), pages 381-413.
    4. Moulin, Herve & Sprumont, Yves, 2005. "On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 1-35, November.
    5. Moulin, Herve & Stong, Richard, 2003. "Filling a multicolor urn: an axiomatic analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 242-269, October.
    6. Moulin, Herve, 2005. "Split-Proof Probabilistic Scheduling," Working Papers 2004-06, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    7. Carmen Herrero & Ricardo Martínez, 2008. "Balanced allocation methods for claims problems with indivisibilities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(4), pages 603-617, May.
    8. Carmen Herrero & Ricardo Martínez, 2008. "Up methods in the allocation of indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 16(2), pages 272-283, December.
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    10. Chambers, Christopher P., 2006. "Asymmetric rules for claims problems without homogeneity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 241-260, February.

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    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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