The Talmud Rule And The Securement Of Agents? Awards
This paper provides a new characterization of the Talmud rule by means of a new property, called securement. This property says that any agent holding a feasible claim will get at least one nht of her claim, where n is the number of agents involved. We show that securement together with a weak version of path independence and the standard properties of self-duality and consistency characterize the Talmud rule.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2003|
|Publication status:||Published by Ivie|
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