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Rationing in the presence of baselines

  • Jens Hougaard

    ()

  • Juan Moreno-Ternero
  • Lars Østerdal

We analyze a general model of rationing in which agents have baselines, in addition to claims against the (insufficient) endowment of the good to be allocated. Many real-life problems fit this general model (e.g., bankruptcy with prioritized claims, resource allocation in the public health care sector, water distribution in drought periods). We introduce (and characterize) a natural class of allocation methods for this model. Any method within the class is associated with a rule in the standard rationing model, and we show that if the latter obeys some focal properties, the former obeys them too. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-012-0664-4
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 40 (2013)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
Pages: 1047-1066

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:40:y:2013:i:4:p:1047-1066
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  3. Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2009. "The Proportional Rule for Multi-Issue Bankruptcy Problems," Working Papers 2009-6, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
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  7. Marc Fleurbaey & John E. Roemer, 2010. "Judicial Precedent as a Dynamic Rationale for Axiomatic Bargaining Theory," IDEP Working Papers 1002, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised 07 May 2010.
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  14. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of Axioms for Bankruptcy Problems," Working Paper Series no1, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
  15. Nir Dagan, 1996. "New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 51-59, January.
  16. Juan Moreno-Ternero & Antonio Villar, 2006. "New characterizations of a classical bankruptcy rule," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 73-84, August.
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  18. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
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