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Baseline Rationing

  • Jens L. Hougaard


    (University of Copenhagen)

  • Juan D. Moreno-Ternero


    (Department of Economic Theory, Universidad de Málaga)

  • Lars P. Østerdal


    (University of Copenhagen)

We analyze a general model of rationing in which agents have baselines, in addition to claims against the (insufficient) endowment of the good to be allocated. Many real-life problems fit this extended model (e.g., bankruptcy with prioritized claims, resource allocation in the public health care sector, water distribution in drought periods). We introduce (and characterize) a natural class of allocation methods for such problems. Any method within the class is associated with a rule in the standard rationing model, and we show that if the latter obeys some properties reflecting principles of impartiality, priority and solidarity, the former obeys them too.

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Paper provided by Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center in its series Working Papers with number 2011-04.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mal:wpaper:2011-4
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  1. Thomson, W., 1989. "Cooperative Models Of Bargaining," RCER Working Papers 177, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  2. Jens L. Hougaard & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero & Lars P. Østerdal, 2011. "A unifying framework for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims," Working Papers 2011-03, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
  3. Toru Hokari & William Thomson, 2003. "Claims problems and weighted generalizations of the Talmud rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 241-261, 03.
  4. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 511-520.
  5. MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & VILLAR, Antonio, . "New characterizations of a classical bankruptcy rule," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1926, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Juan de Dios Moreno Ternero & Antonio Villar Notario, 2003. "The Talmud Rule And The Securement Of Agents? Awards," Working Papers. Serie AD 2003-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  7. MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D., 2006. "The proportional rule for multi-issue bankruptcy problems," CORE Discussion Papers 2006076, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Roemer, John E, 1986. "Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(4), pages 751-84, November.
  9. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of Axioms for Bankruptcy Problems," Working Paper Series no1, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
  10. MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & VILLAR, Antonio, . "The TAL-family or rules for bankruptcy problems," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1897, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  11. Marc Fleurbaey & John Roemer, 2010. "Judicial Precedent as a Dynamic Rationale for Axiomatic Bargaining Theory," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 814577000000000442,
  12. MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & ROEMER, John E., 2005. "Impartiality, priority, and solidarity in the theory of justice," CORE Discussion Papers 2005077, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  13. Biung-Ghi Ju & Juan Moreno-Ternero, 2011. "Progressive and merging-proof taxation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 43-62, February.
  14. Hokari, Toru & Thomson, William, 2008. "On properties of division rules lifted by bilateral consistency," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(11), pages 1057-1071, December.
  15. Nir Dagan, 1996. "New Characterizations of Old Bankruptcy Rules," Economic theory and game theory 002, Nir Dagan.
  16. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
  17. Hervé Moulin, 2000. "Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 643-684, May.
  18. Ju, Biung-Ghi & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Sakai, Toyotaka, 2007. "Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 1-26, January.
  19. Diego Dominguez & William Thomson, 2006. "A new solution to the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 283-307, 06.
  20. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
  21. Kaminski, Marek M., 2006. "Parametric rationing methods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 115-133, January.
  22. Pulido, M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Llorca, N. & Sánchez-Soriano, J., 2008. "Compromise solutions for bankruptcy situations with references," Other publications TiSEM d5052c4d-eda1-4d7e-b3d0-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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