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Baseline Rationing

  • Jens L. Hougaard

    ()

    (University of Copenhagen)

  • Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

    ()

    (Department of Economic Theory, Universidad de Málaga)

  • Lars P. Østerdal

    ()

    (University of Copenhagen)

We analyze a general model of rationing in which agents have baselines, in addition to claims against the (insufficient) endowment of the good to be allocated. Many real-life problems fit this extended model (e.g., bankruptcy with prioritized claims, resource allocation in the public health care sector, water distribution in drought periods). We introduce (and characterize) a natural class of allocation methods for such problems. Any method within the class is associated with a rule in the standard rationing model, and we show that if the latter obeys some properties reflecting principles of impartiality, priority and solidarity, the former obeys them too.

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File URL: http://webdeptos.uma.es/THEconomica/malagawpseries/Papers/METCwp2011-4.pdf
File Function: First version, 2011
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Paper provided by Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center in its series Working Papers with number 2011-04.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mal:wpaper:2011-4
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  5. MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & ROEMER, John E., 2005. "Impartiality, priority, and solidarity in the theory of justice," CORE Discussion Papers 2005077, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2009. "The Proportional Rule for Multi-Issue Bankruptcy Problems," Working Papers 2009-6, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
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  10. Juan de Dios Moreno Ternero & Antonio Villar Notario, 2003. "The Talmud Rule And The Securement Of Agents? Awards," Working Papers. Serie AD 2003-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  11. Nir Dagan, 1996. "New Characterizations of Old Bankruptcy Rules," Economic theory and game theory 002, Nir Dagan.
  12. Toru Hokari & William Thomson, 2007. "On properties of division rules lifted by bilateral consistency," RCER Working Papers 536, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  13. Manuel Pulido & Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano & Natividad Llorca, 2002. "Game Theory Techniques for University Management: An Extended Bankruptcy Model," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 109(1), pages 129-142, January.
  14. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
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  18. Antonio Villar Notario & Juan D. Moreno Ternero, 2001. "The Tal-Family Of Rules For Bankruptcy Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-33, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  19. M. Pulido & P. Borm & R. Hendrickx & N. Llorca & J. Sánchez-Soriano, 2008. "Compromise solutions for bankruptcy situations with references," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 133-141, February.
  20. Pulido, M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Llorca, N. & Sánchez-Soriano, J., 2008. "Compromise solutions for bankruptcy situations with references," Other publications TiSEM d5052c4d-eda1-4d7e-b3d0-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  21. John E. Roemer, 1986. "Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(4), pages 751-784.
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  23. Ju, Biung-Ghi & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Sakai, Toyotaka, 2007. "Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 1-26, January.
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  27. MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & VILLAR, Antonio, . "New characterizations of a classical bankruptcy rule," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1926, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  28. Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
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