IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Baseline Rationing

  • Jens Leth Hougaard

    ()

    (Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen)

  • Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

    (Department of Economics, Universidad de Malaga and Pablo de Olavide)

  • Lars Peter Østerdal

    (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

The standard problem of adjudicating conflicting claims describes a situation in which a given amount of a divisible good has to be allocated among agents who hold claims against it exceeding the available amount. This paper considers more general rationing problems in which, in addition to claims, there exist baselines (to be interpreted as objective entitlements, ideal targets, or past consumption) that might play an important role in the allocation process. The model we present is able to accommodate real-life rationing situations, ranging from resource allocation in the public health care sector to international protocols for the reduction of greenhouse emissions, or water distribution in drought periods. We define a family of allocation methods for such general rationing problems - called baseline rationing rules - and provide an axiomatic characterization for it. Any baseline rationing rule within the family is associated with a standard rule and we show that if the latter obeys some properties reflecting principles of impartiality, priority and solidarity, the former obeys them too.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://okonomi.foi.dk/workingpapers/MSAPpdf/MSAP2010/MSAP_WP05_2010.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics in its series MSAP Working Paper Series with number 05_2010.

as
in new window

Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:foi:msapwp:05_2010
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.ifro.ku.dk/english/

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. JU, Biung-Ghi & MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D., . "Progressive and merging-proof taxation," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2280, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. HOUGAARD, Jens L. & MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & OSTERDAL, Lars P., 2011. "A unifying framework for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims," CORE Discussion Papers 2011071, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Roemer, John E, 1986. "Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(4), pages 751-84, November.
  4. Diego Dominguez & William Thomson, 2006. "A new solution to the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 283-307, 06.
  5. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
  6. MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D., . "The proportional rule for multi-issue bankruptcy problems," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2113, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Thomson, William & Yeh, Chun-Hsien, 2008. "Operators for the adjudication of conflicting claims," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 177-198, November.
  8. Juan Moreno-Ternero & Antonio Villar, 2006. "The TAL-Family of Rules for Bankruptcy Problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 231-249, October.
  9. Thomson, W., 1989. "Cooperative Models Of Bargaining," RCER Working Papers 177, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  10. Juan de Dios Moreno Ternero & Antonio Villar Notario, 2003. "The Talmud Rule And The Securement Of Agents? Awards," Working Papers. Serie AD 2003-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  11. Toru Hokari & William Thomson, 2007. "On properties of division rules lifted by bilateral consistency," RCER Working Papers 536, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  12. Ju, Biung-Ghi & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Sakai, Toyotaka, 2007. "Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 1-26, January.
  13. MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & ROEMER, John E., 2005. "Impartiality, priority, and solidarity in the theory of justice," CORE Discussion Papers 2005077, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  14. Juan Moreno-Ternero & Antonio Villar, 2006. "New characterizations of a classical bankruptcy rule," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 73-84, August.
  15. Marc Fleurbaey & John Roemer, 2010. "Judicial Precedent as a Dynamic Rationale for Axiomatic Bargaining Theory," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 814577000000000442, www.najecon.org.
  16. Kaminski, Marek M., 2006. "Parametric rationing methods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 115-133, January.
  17. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 511-520.
  18. Pulido, M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Llorca, N. & Sánchez-Soriano, J., 2008. "Compromise solutions for bankruptcy situations with references," Other publications TiSEM d5052c4d-eda1-4d7e-b3d0-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  19. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of Axioms for Bankruptcy Problems," Working Paper Series no1, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
  20. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-194180 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Toru Hokari & William Thomson, 2003. "Claims problems and weighted generalizations of the Talmud rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 241-261, 03.
  22. Nir Dagan, 1996. "New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 51-59, January.
  23. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
  24. Hervé Moulin, 2000. "Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 643-684, May.
  25. repec:dgr:uvatin:20080026 is not listed on IDEAS
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:foi:msapwp:05_2010. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Geir Tveit)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.