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Baseline Rationing

  • Jens Leth Hougaard

    (Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen)

  • Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

    (Universidad de Malaga)

  • Lars Peter Østerdal

    (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

The standard problem of adjudicating conflicting claims describes a situation in which a given amount of a divisible good has to be allocated among agents who hold claims against it exceeding the available amount. This paper considers more general rationing problems in which, in addition to claims, there exist baselines (to be interpreted as objective entitlements, ideal targets, or past consumption) that might play an important role in the allocation process. The model we present is able to accommodate real-life rationing situations, ranging from resource allocation in the public health care sector to international protocols for the reduction of greenhouse emissions, or water distribution in drought periods. We define a family of allocation methods for such general rationing problems - called baseline rationing rules - and provide an axiomatic characterization for it. Any baseline rationing rule within the family is associated with a standard rule and we show that if the latter obeys some properties reflecting principles of impartiality, priority and solidarity, the former obeys them too.

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Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 10-16.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1016
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  1. Juan de Dios Moreno Ternero & Antonio Villar Notario, 2003. "The Talmud Rule And The Securement Of Agents? Awards," Working Papers. Serie AD 2003-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  2. Ju, Biung-Ghi & Miyagawa, Eiichi & Sakai, Toyotaka, 2007. "Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 1-26, January.
  3. Pulido, M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Llorca, N. & Sánchez-Soriano, J., 2008. "Compromise solutions for bankruptcy situations with references," Other publications TiSEM d5052c4d-eda1-4d7e-b3d0-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  4. John E. Roemer, 1986. "Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(4), pages 751-784.
  5. Diego Dominguez & William Thomson, 2006. "A new solution to the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 283-307, 06.
  6. MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D., . "The proportional rule for multi-issue bankruptcy problems," CORE Discussion Papers RP 2113, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of Axioms for Bankruptcy Problems," Working Paper Series no1, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
  8. Juan Moreno-Ternero & Antonio Villar, 2006. "The TAL-Family of Rules for Bankruptcy Problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 231-249, October.
  9. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2012. "A unifying framework for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 107-114.
  10. JU, Biung-Ghi & MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D., . "Progressive and merging-proof taxation," CORE Discussion Papers RP 2280, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  11. Thomson, William & Yeh, Chun-Hsien, 2008. "Operators for the adjudication of conflicting claims," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 177-198, November.
  12. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 511-520.
  13. Marc Fleurbaey & John Roemer, 2010. "Judicial Precedent as a Dynamic Rationale for Axiomatic Bargaining Theory," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 814577000000000442,
  14. MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & ROEMER, John E., . "Impartiality, priority, and solidarity in the theory of justice," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1896, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. Nir Dagan, 1996. "New Characterizations of Old Bankruptcy Rules," Economic theory and game theory 002, Nir Dagan.
  16. MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & VILLAR, Antonio, . "New characterizations of a classical bankruptcy rule," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1926, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  17. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
  18. Hervé Moulin, 2000. "Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 643-684, May.
  19. Hokari, Toru & Thomson, William, 2008. "On properties of division rules lifted by bilateral consistency," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(11), pages 1057-1071, December.
  20. Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284 Elsevier.
  21. Toru Hokari & William Thomson, 2003. "Claims problems and weighted generalizations of the Talmud rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 241-261, 03.
  22. Kaminski, Marek M., 2006. "Parametric rationing methods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 115-133, January.
  23. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
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