The TAL-Family of Rules for Bankruptcy Problems
This paper analyzes a family of solutions to bankruptcy problems that generalizes the Talmud rule (T) and encompasses both the constrained equal-awards rule (A) and the constrained equal-losses rule (L). We study the structural properties of this family of rules and provide a characterization result. That allows us to identify the distinctive features of these three reference rules, T, A, L.
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Volume (Year): 27 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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- Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Villar, Antonio, 2004.
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- MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & VILLAR, Antonio, "undated". "New characterizations of a classical bankruptcy rule," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1926, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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