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Bankruptcy games and the Ibn Ezra’s proposal

Author

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  • José Alcalde

    ()

  • María Marco

    ()

  • José Silva

Abstract

This paper explores an old solution for bankruptcy problems, described by Ibn Ezra in the XII century. Particularly, we introduce a new way of extending the Ibn Ezra’s proposal, the Generalized Ibn Ezra solution, by imposing that the general distribution principle from which it is inspired remains fixed. In this context, we follow the interpretation of bankruptcy problems in terms of TU games given in O’Neill (1982), and propose the analysis of the Transition Game associated to bankruptcy problems to provide a characterization for the Generalized Ibn Ezra solution. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Suggested Citation

  • José Alcalde & María Marco & José Silva, 2005. "Bankruptcy games and the Ibn Ezra’s proposal," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(1), pages 103-114, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:103-114
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0527-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. José Alcalde & María Marco & José Silva, 2008. "The minimal overlap rule revisited," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(1), pages 109-128, June.
    2. repec:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-00032 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. William Thomson, 2008. "Two families of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(4), pages 667-692, December.
    4. Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel & Peris, Josep E. & Solís-Baltodano, María-José, 2017. "Resource Allocation with Warranties in Claims Problems," QM&ET Working Papers 17-4, University of Alicante, D. Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory.
    5. Thomson, William, 2015. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: An update," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 41-59.
    6. Giménez Gómez, José M. (José Manuel) & Peris, Josep E. & Solís Baltodano, María José, 2017. "Resource allocation with warranties in claims problems," Working Papers 2072/292437, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    7. William Thomson, 2012. "Lorenz rankings of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 50(3), pages 547-569, August.
    8. José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez & M. Marco-Gil, 2014. "A new approach for bounding awards in bankruptcy problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(2), pages 447-469, August.
    9. Yoichi Kasajima & Rodrigo Velez, 2011. "Reflecting inequality of claims in gains and losses," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 46(2), pages 283-295, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bankruptcy problems; Cooperative games; Ibn Ezra’s proposal.;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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