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Two families of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims

We define two families of rules to adjudicate conflicting claims. The first family contains the constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses, Talmud, and minimal overlap rules. The second family, which also contains the constrained equal awards and constrained equal losses rules, is obtained from the first one by exchanging, for each problem, how well agents with relatively larger claims are treated as compared to agents with relatively smaller claims. In each case, we identify the subfamily of consistent rules.

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File URL: http://rcer.econ.rochester.edu/RCERPAPERS/rcer_535.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 535.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:535
Contact details of provider: Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.

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  1. Diego Dominguez & William Thomson, 2006. "A new solution to the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 283-307, 06.
  2. Hokari, Toru & Thomson, William, 2008. "On properties of division rules lifted by bilateral consistency," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(11), pages 1057-1071, December.
  3. Gustavo Bergantiños & Luciano Méndez-Naya, 2001. "Additivity in bankruptcy problems and in allocation problems," Spanish Economic Review, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 223-229.
  4. Juan D. Moreno-Ternero & Antonio Villar, 2006. "On the Relative Equitability of a Family of Taxation Rules," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(2), pages 283-291, 05.
  5. Antonio Villar Notario & Juan D. Moreno Ternero, 2001. "The Tal-Family Of Rules For Bankruptcy Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-33, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  6. William Thomson, 2007. "On the existence of consistent rules to adjudicate conflicting claims: a constructive geometric approach," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 225-251, November.
  7. Nir Dagan, 1996. "New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 51-59, January.
  8. José Alcalde & María Marco & José Silva, 2005. "Bankruptcy games and the Ibn Ezra’s proposal," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 103-114, 07.
  9. José Alcalde & María Marco & José Silva, 2008. "The minimal overlap rule revisited," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 109-128, June.
  10. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
  11. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of Axioms for Bankruptcy Problems," Working Paper Series no1, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
  12. Thomson, William & Yeh, Chun-Hsien, 2008. "Operators for the adjudication of conflicting claims," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 177-198, November.
  13. Youngsub Chun & William Thomson, 2004. "Convergence under Replication of Rules to Adjudicate Conflicting Claims," RCER Working Papers 512, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  14. Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  15. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 511-520.
  16. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
  17. Toru Hokari & William Thomson, 2003. "Claims problems and weighted generalizations of the Talmud rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 241-261, 03.
  18. William Thomson, 2006. "The Two-Agent Claims-Truncated Proportional Rule Has No Consistent Extension: A Constructive Proof," RCER Working Papers 529, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
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