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Compromising between the proportional and constrained equal awards rules

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  • William Thomson

    (University of Rochester)

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  • William Thomson, 2014. "Compromising between the proportional and constrained equal awards rules," RCER Working Papers 584, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  • Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:584
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    File URL: http://rcer.econ.rochester.edu/RCERPAPERS/rcer_584.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Villar, Antonio, 2004. "The Talmud rule and the securement of agents' awards," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 245-257, March.
    2. Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto & Volij, Oscar, 1997. "A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 55-72, January.
    3. Dagan, Nir & Volij, Oscar, 1993. "The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative bargaining approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 287-297, November.
    4. William Thomson, 2007. "On the existence of consistent rules to adjudicate conflicting claims: a constructive geometric approach," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(3), pages 225-251, November.
    5. Hervé Moulin, 2000. "Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 643-684, May.
    6. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(4), pages 511-520.
    7. Hokari, Toru & Thomson, William, 2008. "On properties of division rules lifted by bilateral consistency," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(11), pages 1057-1071, December.
    8. William Thomson, 2008. "Two families of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(4), pages 667-692, December.
    9. Giménez-Gómez, José-Manuel & Peris, Josep E., 2014. "A proportional approach to claims problems with a guaranteed minimum," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 232(1), pages 109-116.
    10. Juan Moreno-Ternero & Antonio Villar, 2006. "The TAL-Family of Rules for Bankruptcy Problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(2), pages 231-249, October.
    11. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of Axioms for Bankruptcy Problems," Working Paper Series no1, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
    12. Chambers, Christopher P. & Thomson, William, 2002. "Group order preservation and the proportional rule for the adjudication of conflicting claims," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 235-252, December.
    13. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
    14. Carmen Herrero & Antonio Villar, 2002. "Sustainability in bankruptcy problems," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 10(2), pages 261-273, December.
    15. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
    16. repec:cor:louvrp:-1899 is not listed on IDEAS
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