A New Solution to the Problem of Adjudicating Conflicting Claims
For the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims, we consider the requirement that each agent should receive at least 1/n his claim truncated at the amount to divide, where n is the number of claimants (Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2004a). We identify two families of rules satisfying this bound. We then formulate the requirement that for each problem, the awards vector should be obtainable in two equivalent ways, (i) directly or (ii) in two steps, first assigning to each claimant his lower bound and then applying the rule to the appropriately revised problem. We show that there is only one rule satisfying this requirement. We name it the "recursive rule", as it is obtained by a recursion. We then undertake a systematic investigation of the properties of the rule.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.|
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