Convergence under replication of rules to adjudicate conflicting claims
We study the behavior of rules for the adjudication of con°icting claims when there are a large number of claimants with small claims. We model such situations by replicating some basic problem. We show that under replication, the random arrival rule (O'Neill, 1982) behaves like the proportional rule, the rule that is the most often recommended in this context. Also, under replication, the minimal overlap rule (O'Neill, 1982) behaves like the constrained equal losses rule, the rule that selects a division at which all claimants experience equal losses subject to no-one receiving a negative amount.
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- William Thomson, 2008.
"Two families of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(4), pages 667-692, December.
- William Thomson, 2007. "Two families of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims," RCER Working Papers 535, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
- Thomson, William, 1988. "A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 237-254, December.
- O'Neill, Barry, 1982. "A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 345-371, June.
- Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
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