Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems
We analyze the problem of extending a given bilateral principle of justice to a consistent n-creditor bankruptcy rule. Based on the bilateral principle, we build a family of binary relations on the set of creditors in order to make bilateral comparisons between them. We find that the possibility of extending a specific bilateral principle of justice in a consistent way is closely related to the quasi-transitivity of the binary relations mentioned above.
|Date of creation:||1997|
|Publication status:||Published in International Journal of Game Theory 26:11-25 (1997)|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Nir Dagan, Dept. of Economics and Management, Tel-Hai Academic College, Upper Galilee, Israel.|
Web page: https://www.nirdagan.com/research/
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