New characterizations of a classical bankruptcy rule
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|Note:||In : Review of Economic Design, 10, 73-84, 2006|
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- Moulin, Herve, 2002.
"Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing,"
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,
in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 289-357
- Toru Hokari & William Thomson, 2003. "Claims problems and weighted generalizations of the Talmud rule," Economic Theory, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 21(2), pages 241-261, 03.
- Nir Dagan, 1996.
"New characterizations of old bankruptcy rules,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(1), pages 51-59, January.
- Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
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