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Balanced allocation methods for claims problems with indivisibilities

  • Carmen Herrero

    ()

  • Ricardo Martínez

    ()

We study claims problems in which a certain amount of indivisible units (of an homogeneous good) has to be distributed among a group of agents, when this amount is not enough to fully satisfy agents' demands. We are interested in finding solutions satisfying robustness and fairness properties. To do that, we define the M-down methods, which are the unique robust (composition down and consistency) and fair (balancedness or conditional full compensation ) rules. Besides, we also establish the relationships between these M-down methods and the constrained equal awards rule.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-007-0262-z
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 30 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (May)
Pages: 603-617

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:30:y:2008:i:4:p:603-617
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  1. Juan Moreno-Ternero & Antonio Villar, 2006. "New characterizations of a classical bankruptcy rule," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 73-84, August.
  2. Herrero, Carmen & Villar, Antonio, 2001. "The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 307-328, November.
  3. Nir Dagan, 1996. "New Characterizations of Old Bankruptcy Rules," Economic theory and game theory 002, Nir Dagan.
  4. Moulin Herve, 1984. "Egalitarianisme and utilitarianism in quasi-linear bargaining," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8417, CEPREMAP.
  5. Hervé Moulin, 2000. "Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 643-684, May.
  6. Moulin, Herve & Stong, Richard, 2001. "Fair Queuing and Other Probabilistic Allocation Methods," Working Papers 2000-09, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  7. Young, H. P., 1988. "Distributive justice in taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 321-335, April.
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