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Game Theory Techniques for University Management: An Extended Bankruptcy Model

Listed author(s):
  • Manuel Pulido


  • Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano
  • Natividad Llorca
Registered author(s):

    In this paper we analyze a conflict situation in university management. This situation deals with how to allocate money among faculties to buy equipment for teaching laboratories. We will tackle this real problem using tools from Game Theory. We discuss the proposal which has been implemented in the Miguel Hernández University. Related to this kind of situation we introduce an extended bankruptcy problem, in which two ways of measuring the demands of the administrative entities exist: the “objective entitlements” and the “claims”. We study and propose suitable bankruptcy rules for this new type of problem. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Annals of Operations Research.

    Volume (Year): 109 (2002)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages: 129-142

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:109:y:2002:i:1:p:129-142:10.1023/a:1016395917734
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1016395917734
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