Single-plateaued preferences generalize single-peaked preferences by allowing for multiple bestelements. These preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting,strategy-proofness andmatching problems. We examine the notion of single-plateauedness in a choice-theoretic setting.Single-plateaued choice is characterized by means of a collinear interval continuity property inthe presence of independence of irrelevant alternatives. Further results establish that our notionof single-plateauedness conforms to the motivation underlying the term and we analyze theconsequences of alternative continuity properties. The importance of basic assumptions such asclosedness and convexity is discussed.
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