Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued
We consider private good economies with single-plateaued preferences. A solution selects for each preference profile a non-empty set of allocations. An agent strictly prefers a set of allocations to another set of allocations if and only if he strictly prefers any allocation in the first set to any in the second set according to his single-plateaued preference relation. We characterize the class of sequential-allotment solutions by essentially single-valuedness, Pareto-indifference, and coalitional stragety-proofness. These solutions are the Pareto-indifferent extensions of the solutions studied by Barberà et al. 1997.
Volume (Year): 7 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Note:||Received: 9 May 2000 / Accepted: 1 May 2001|
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