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Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued

Author

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  • Lars Ehlers

    (Département de Sciences Économiques and CIREQ, Université de Montréal, Montréal, Québec H3C 3J7, Canada)

Abstract

We consider private good economies with single-plateaued preferences. A solution selects for each preference profile a non-empty set of allocations. An agent strictly prefers a set of allocations to another set of allocations if and only if he strictly prefers any allocation in the first set to any in the second set according to his single-plateaued preference relation. We characterize the class of sequential-allotment solutions by essentially single-valuedness, Pareto-indifference, and coalitional stragety-proofness. These solutions are the Pareto-indifferent extensions of the solutions studied by Barberà et al. 1997.

Suggested Citation

  • Lars Ehlers, 2002. "Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 7(1), pages 105-115.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:105-115
    Note: Received: 9 May 2000 / Accepted: 1 May 2001
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans, 2014. "Single-basined choice," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 162-168.
    2. Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2015. "Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 32-39.
    3. Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2013. "Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Single-Plateaued Preferences," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201311, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
    4. Bossert, Walter & Peters, Hans, 2013. "Single-plateaued choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 134-139.
    5. Lars Ehlers, 2011. "A characterization of the uniform rule without Pareto-optimality," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 447-452, December.
    6. Michele Lombardi & Foivos Savva & Nikolas Zivanas, 2023. "Implementation in strong core by codes of rights," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(3), pages 503-515, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Single-plateaued preferences; strategy-proofness; sequential-allotment solutions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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