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A note on strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences

Author

Listed:
  • Dolors Berga

    (Universitat de Girona)

Abstract

This note integrates the role of Nash independence of irrelevant alternatives with the axioms of strategy-proofness and plateau-onliness to develop a recursive procedure over the number of agents for the construction of rules characterized as a class of admissible social choice functions in one pure public good economies with single-plateaued preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Dolors Berga, 2025. "A note on strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 45(4), pages 1666-1671.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-25-00622
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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