Strategy-proofness, tops-only, and the uniform rule
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Volume (Year): 72 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
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- Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2004. "A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23(2), pages 187-206, October.
- Toyotaka Sakai & Takuma Wakayama, 2008. "Uniform, Equal Division, and Other Envy-free Rules between the Two," ISER Discussion Paper 0723, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Thomson, William, 1995.
"Population-Monotonic Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(2), pages 229-246, March.
- Thomson, W., 1991. "Population-Monotonic Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division when Preferences are Single-Peaked," RCER Working Papers 302, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Hideyuki Mizobuchi & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2006.
"Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
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- Hideyuki Mizobuchi & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2005. "Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies," ISER Discussion Paper 0628, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Yves Sprumont, 1995. "Strategyproof Collective Choice in Economic and Political Environments," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 68-107, February.
- Nir Dagan, 1996.
"A Note on Thomson's Characterizations of the Uniform Rule,"
Economic theory and game theory
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- Dagan, Nir, 1996. "A Note on Thomson's Characterizations of the Uniform Rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 255-261, April.
- John A. Weymark, 2008.
"Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property,"
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Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(1), pages 7-26, 02.
- John A. Weymark, 2004. "Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0409, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006.
- Thomson William, 1994. "Consistent Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 219-245, August.
- Ching, Stephen & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 1998. "A Maximal Domain for the Existence of Strategy-Proof Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 157-166, January.
- Ehlers, Lars, 2000. "Indifference and the uniform rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 303-308, June.
- Ching, Stephen, 1992. "A simple characterization of the uniform rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 57-60, September.
- Olivier Bochet & Ton Storcken, 2008. "Maximal Domains for Strategy-proof or Maskin Monotonic Choice Rules," Diskussionsschriften dp0901, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2001.
"Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 367-387, November.
- Jordi MassóAuthor-Name: Alejandro Neme, "undated". "Maximal Domain Of Preferences In The Division Problem," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 434.99, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-519, March.
- Thomson, William, 1997. "The Replacement Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 145-168, September.
- Eric Maskin, 1999.
"Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality,"
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- Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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