A characterization of the uniform rule without Pareto-optimality
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Volume (Year): 2 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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- Lars Ehlers, 2002. "Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 113-131.
- EHLERS, Lars, 2001.
"On Fixed-Path Rationing Methods,"
Cahiers de recherche
2001-24, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-19, March.
- Ehlers, Lars, 2000. "Indifference and the uniform rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 303-308, June.
- Ching, Stephen, 1992. "A simple characterization of the uniform rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 57-60, September.
- Lars Ehlers, 2002. "Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 105-115.
- Sonmez, Tayfun, 1994. "Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 229-235, November.
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