Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked
We consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. Thomson (1994a), Sönmez (1994), and Moulin (1999) introduce three different resource-monotonicity conditions. In each characterization they derive, the axioms are independent. Under Pareto-optimality, the three resource-monotonicity conditions are equivalent. We investigate whether the interchange of these conditions still yields a valid characterization, and when the characterization still holds, whether it is a tight result or not. We strengthen each of the results, that is either the used resource-monotonicity condition can be replaced by a weaker one, or by using another resource-monotonicity condition, the result is not tight. Our main result is that when at least three agents are present, the class of fixed-path rationing methods is characterized by weak one-sided resource-monotonicity, strategy-proofness, and consistency.
Volume (Year): 20 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Note:||Received: April 24, 2000; revised version: April 10, 2001|
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