Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants
We investigate the implications of introducing immunosuppressants to the kidney exchange problem. Immunosuppressants relax biological constraints between patients and donors, allowing patients to receive transplants from any donor. Given the limited availability, we propose how to assign immunosuppressants and how to match patients to donors to facilitate transplants. We ask whether there exist Pareto efficient solutions that satisfy additional requirements of monotonicity and maximal improvement. We propose modifications of the top-trading cycles solutions to achieve these requirements. To quantify the welfare improvement as per our proposal, we conduct counterfactual analyses using transplant data from South Korea. Our result suggests that the current use of immunosuppressants could have been reduced by 55 percent.
|Date of creation:||06 Sep 2017|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/wparchive/index.html|
References listed on IDEAS
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- Sönmez, Tayfun & Ünver, M. Utku, 2014.
"Altruistically unbalanced kidney exchange,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 105-129.
- Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2011. "Altruistically Unbalanced Kidney Exchange," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 781, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 30 Jun 2013.
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- Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Molis, Elena, 2011. "Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: The Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-16, September.
- ALCADE-UNZU, Jorge & MOLIS, Elena, "undated". "Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers RP 2331, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- ALCALDE-UNZU, Jorge & MOLIS, Elena, 2009. "Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers 2009062, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- William Thomson, 1999. "Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: A survey and open questions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(3), pages 373-394.
- Andersson, Tommy & Kratz, Jörgen, 2016. "Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group Barrier," Working Papers 2016:11, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 28 Sep 2016.
- Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver & Özgür Yilmaz, 2016. "How (Not) to Integrate Blood Subtyping Technology to Kidney Exchange," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 900, Boston College Department of Economics. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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