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Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group Barrier

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Abstract

Medical technology making kidney transplantation over the blood group barrier possible is now a reality. This paper investigates how such technology should be implemented when designing pairwise kidney exchange programs. The possibility to receive a kidney transplant from a blood group incompatible donor motivates an extension of the preference domain, allowing patients to distinguish between compatible donors and half-compatible donors (i.e., blood group incompatible donors that are made compatible using immunosuppressive drugs). It is demonstrated that the number of transplants can be increased by providing an incentive for patients with half-compatible donors to participate in kidney exchange programs. The results also suggest that the technology is beneficial for patient groups that are traditionally disadvantaged in kidney exchange programs (e.g., blood group O patients). The positive effect of allowing transplants over the blood group barrier is larger than the corresponding effects of including compatible patient-donor pairs and allowing three-way exchanges in addition to pairwise exchanges.

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  • Andersson, Tommy & Kratz, Jörgen, 2016. "Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group Barrier," Working Papers 2016:11, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 29 Nov 2017.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2016_011
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    File URL: http://project.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/papers/wp16_11.pdf
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    1. Sönmez, Tayfun & Ünver, M. Utku, 2014. "Altruistically unbalanced kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 105-129.
    2. Tayfun Sönmez & Alvin E. Roth & M. Utku Ünver, 2007. "Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 828-851, June.
    3. Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005. "Pairwise kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 151-188, December.
    4. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Kidney Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(2), pages 457-488.
    5. Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Unver, Utku & Delmonico, Francis & Saidman, Susan L., 2014. "Utilizing List Exchange and Non-directed Donation through “Chain” Paired Kidney Donations," MPRA Paper 58246, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Saidman, Susan L. & Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Unver, M. Utku & Delmonico, Francis L., 2014. "Increasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation by Matching for Two and Three Way Exchanges," MPRA Paper 58247, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2005. "A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 376-380, May.
    8. Okumura, Yasunori, 2014. "Priority matchings revisited," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 242-249.
    9. Sönmez, Tayfun & Ünver, M. Utku & Yılmaz, Özgür, 2018. "How (not) to integrate blood subtyping technology to kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 193-231.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sönmez, Tayfun & Ünver, M. Utku & Yılmaz, Özgür, 2018. "How (not) to integrate blood subtyping technology to kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 193-231.
    2. Youngsub Chun & Eun jeong Heo & Sunghoon Heo, 2017. "Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 17-00012, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    3. Haluk Ergin & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2020. "Efficient and Incentive‐Compatible Liver Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(3), pages 965-1005, May.
    4. Yao Cheng & Zaifu Yang, 2017. "Efficient Kidney Exchange with Dichotomous Preferences," Discussion Papers 17/13, Department of Economics, University of York.
    5. Jorgen Kratz, 2019. "Triage in Kidney Exchange," Discussion Papers 19/04, Department of Economics, University of York.
    6. Tayfun Sönmez & M Utku Ünver, 2017. "Market design for living-donor organ exchanges: an economic policy perspective," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(4), pages 676-704.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    market design; pairwise kidney exchange; blood group incompatibility; priority matchings; half-compatibility priority matchings;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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