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Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group Barrier

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Abstract

This paper investigates a pairwise kidney exchange program that contains patient-donor pairs where patients can receive a kidney across the blood group barrier from their own donors. Patients in such pairs gain strictly by an exchange if they are matched to a fully compatible donor. Of particular interest is the set of priority matchings where the number of patients matched to fully compatible donors is maximized among all priority matchings and where all patients that can receive a kidney across the blood group barrier from their own donors are either matched to their own donors or to fully compatible donors. The main result demonstrates that matchings in this set can be identified by solving an appropriately defined maximum weight matching problem. A simulation study also suggests that the positive effect on the total number of transplants is larger when including patients that can receive a kidney across the blood group barrier from their own donors than the effect of including altruistic donors.

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File URL: http://project.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/papers/wp16_11.pdf
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Paper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2016:11.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 17 Jun 2016
Date of revision: 28 Sep 2016
Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2016_011
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Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden

Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/en

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Keywords: market design; pairwise kidney exchange; blood group incompatibility; priority matchings; half-compatibility priority matchings;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

  • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
  • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
  • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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  1. Sönmez, Tayfun & Ünver, M. Utku, 2014. "Altruistically unbalanced kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 105-129.
  2. Tayfun Sönmez & Alvin E. Roth & M. Utku Ünver, 2007. "Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 828-851, June.
  3. Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005. "Pairwise kidney exchange," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 151-188, December.
  4. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Kidney Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(2), pages 457-488.
  5. Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Unver, Utku & Delmonico, Francis & Saidman, Susan L., 2014. "Utilizing List Exchange and Non-directed Donation through “Chain” Paired Kidney Donations," MPRA Paper 58246, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Okumura, Yasunori, 2014. "Priority matchings revisited," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 242-249.
  7. Saidman, Susan L. & Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Unver, M. Utku & Delmonico, Francis L., 2014. "Increasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation by Matching for Two and Three Way Exchanges," MPRA Paper 58247, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2005. "A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 376-380, May.
  9. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver & Özgür Yilmaz, 2016. "How (Not) to Integrate Blood Subtyping Technology to Kidney Exchange," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 900, Boston College Department of Economics.
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Cited by:

  1. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2017. "Market Design for Living-Donor Organ Exchanges: An Economic Policy Perspective," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 932, Boston College Department of Economics.
  2. Youngsub Chun & Eun jeong Heo & Sunghoon Heo, 2017. "Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 17-00012, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.

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