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Efficient Kidney Exchange with Dichotomous Preferences

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Listed:
  • Yao Cheng
  • Zaifu Yang

Abstract

This paper considers a general and practical kidney exchange model with compatible or incompatible patient-donor pairs, single donors, and patients on the waiting list. Efficient exchange procedures are proposed with dichotomous preferences in which only one-way, two-way, three, or four-way chains or cycles of exchange are used. We derive a tight upper bound of the possible number of feasible kidney transplants in each case of exchange and provide substantial simulation results. We find that two-way cycles and chains of exchange can substantially increase the number of feasible transplants, threeway can have a visible effect, and at most four-way cycles and chains suffice to capture all potential gains of exchange. Our results are not only theoretically interesting but also have meaningful policy implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Yao Cheng & Zaifu Yang, 2017. "Efficient Kidney Exchange with Dichotomous Preferences," Discussion Papers 17/13, Department of Economics, University of York.
  • Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:17/13
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    File URL: https://www.york.ac.uk/media/economics/documents/discussionpapers/2017/1713.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andersson, Tommy & Kratz, J├Ârgen, 2016. "Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group Barrier," Working Papers 2016:11, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 29 Nov 2017.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Kidney Exchange; Efficiency; Matching; Simulation.;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

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