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Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange

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  • Nicolò, Antonio
  • Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo

Abstract

We consider a Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) model in which patients' preferences are restricted so that patients prefer kidneys from compatible younger donors to kidneys from older ones. We propose a family of rules, sequential priority rules, that only allow for pairwise exchanges and satisfy individual rationality, efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness. These rules allocate kidneys according to a priority algorithm that gives priority to patients with younger donors and assign kidneys from younger donors first. We extend the analysis to rules that allow multiple ways exchanges and to the case of patients who have more than one potential donor.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolò, Antonio & Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo, 2017. "Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 508-524.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:508-524
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.006
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    Cited by:

    1. Jorgen Kratz, "undated". "Conflicting Objectives in Kidney Exchange," Discussion Papers 23/04, Department of Economics, University of York.
    2. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2020. "Incentivized Kidney Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(7), pages 2198-2224, July.
    3. Klimentova, Xenia & Biró, Péter & Viana, Ana & Costa, Virginia & Pedroso, João Pedro, 2023. "Novel integer programming models for the stable kidney exchange problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 307(3), pages 1391-1407.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Kidney exchange; Age-based preferences; Sequential priority rules; Strategy-proofness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General

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