IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/boc/bocoec/868.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Enhancing the Efficiency of and Equity in Transplant Organ Allocation via Incentivized Exchange

Author

Listed:
  • Tayfun Sönmez

    () (Boston College)

  • M. Utku Ünver

    (Boston College)

Abstract

Within the last decade kidney exchange has become a mainstream paradigm to increase the number of kidney transplants. However, compatible pairs do not participate, and the full benefit from exchange can be realized only if they do. In this paper, we propose a new incentive scheme that relies on incentivizing participation of compatible pairs in exchange via insurance for the patient for a future renal failure. Efficiency and equity analyses of this scheme are conducted and compared with efficiency and equity outcomes of live donation and living donor organ exchange. We also present the potential role of such an incentive scheme to strengthen the national kidney exchange system.

Suggested Citation

  • Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2015. "Enhancing the Efficiency of and Equity in Transplant Organ Allocation via Incentivized Exchange," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 868, Boston College Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:868
    Note: A later version of this paper appears as WP 931.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-P/wp868.pdf
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yeon‐Koo Che & Jinwoo Kim & Konrad Mierendorff, 2013. "Generalized Reduced‐Form Auctions: A Network‐Flow Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2487-2520, November.
    2. Stergios Athanassoglou & Jay Sethuraman, 2011. "House allocation with fractional endowments," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(3), pages 481-513, August.
    3. repec:hrv:faseco:30831454 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Yeon-Koo Che & Fuhito Kojima, 2010. "Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1625-1672, September.
    5. Eduardo M. Azevedo & Jacob D. Leshno, 2016. "A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(5), pages 1235-1268.
    6. Katta, Akshay-Kumar & Sethuraman, Jay, 2006. "A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 231-250, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Nicolò, Antonio & Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo, 2017. "Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 508-524.
    2. repec:oup:oxford:v:33:y:2017:i:4:p:676-704. is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Tayfun Sönmez & M Utku Ünver, 2017. "Market design for living-donor organ exchanges: an economic policy perspective," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(4), pages 676-704.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market design; organ allocation; kidney exchange; equity; efficiency; compatible pairs;

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:868. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/debocus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.